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1 Introduction:  Philosophy and Child 
Poverty 
 Child poverty is surely one of the most severe problems in today’s world 
and undoubtedly an ethical issue that needs to be tackled. It is hard to 
find anyone who argues against the claim that children should not be 
poor and that we should do something about that. But if we go beyond 
these obvious truths and dig deeper, we will find many unanswered 
questions spanning different disciplines, including conceptual, empir-
ical and – as we will particularly argue in this book – normative ques-
tions. Child poverty is first and foremost an issue of social sciences, and 
most publications and studies on this topic belong to that field. But 
due to its wide-ranging consequences, disciplines such as medicine and 
psychology are also concerned with it, and more and more researchers 
acknowledge that such a complex phenomenon must be investigated 
based on a multidisciplinary approach. Furthermore, it is a highly rele-
vant political topic, and the fight against child poverty is part of the 
agenda of national and international politicians alike. The reduction 
of child poverty was part of the Millennium Goals, it will certainly be 
a goal in the post-2015 agenda, and it is included in the Europe 2020 
strategy of the European Union, as well as in countless national action 
plans or policies. 
 If one looks at the current state of research and what is done to help 
children in poverty, it is not easy get the full picture. There are many 
different conceptions of child poverty, different methods to measure it 
and no consensus on how best to alleviate it. Philosophy is currently 
only marginally involved in these debates, but the fields of poverty 
research and poverty alleviation are implicitly deeply entangled with 
philosophical issues – most importantly, from our point of view at least, 
with normative and ethical ones. We would like to briefly name four 
of them here, before going on to argue for the importance of a deeper 
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philosophical look into child poverty and show how we will develop our 
argument in the course of this book. 
 The first issue is conceptualizing poverty and child poverty. Two ideas 
are well suited to illustrate that: firstly, poverty is an ‘essentially contested’ 
concept, which means that there will presumably never be a consensus 
on how to understand it properly; secondly, it is a ‘thick concept’, in 
the sense that it combines both descriptive and normative dimensions 
(Schweiger 2012). Every concept of poverty is more than just an empir-
ical description, including a normative dimension, which unfolds in 
two directions. On the one hand, poverty is evaluative. Describing an 
adult or child as poor is in most cases also meant to describe the living 
condition of this person as bad and, to some extent, morally wrong. 
Entailed in almost all definitions found in poverty research, in policy 
contexts and in the public and media discourse is that being poor is not 
good, not something that should be aspired to. On the other hand – and 
this follows from the judgment that it is something bad – poverty has a 
certain appellative character. It is used to trigger actions of other people 
or institutions. Due to this normative dimension, poverty is in a way an 
‘essentially contested’ concept: reaching a consensus on its definition 
and measurement is very unlikely. Paul Spicker, for example, has distin-
guished twenty-four concepts of poverty in sociological research alone 
(Spicker 2007). What it means for a person to be poor is highly unclear, 
simply because we need to have some kind of normative theory in the 
background to tell us what aspects of human life or of life in a particular 
society are important enough to determine poverty. Are resources or 
capabilities what matter, or is it life satisfaction? What are the important 
things that we can and should use to measure and track poverty? 
Naturally, various normative theories can be used for that purpose, and 
they will most certainly produce different results. We will introduce and 
discuss many of the relevant concepts in the course of this book. What 
is important at this stage is to realize that normative considerations have 
an important place already in the conceptualization of poverty and that 
it is not possible to grasp it descriptively only. 
 The second issue is poverty measurement. There are many ethical 
issues about conducting poverty research itself, especially with children 
(Bostock 2002; Sime 2008). Poverty is a sensitive issue; it runs deep, 
making the poor vulnerable. Qualitative research in particular often 
demands that people talk about private matters. It happens very close to 
the lives and experiences of poor people, and it touches upon sensitive 
issues, which are connected to feelings of anger, shame and humiliation. 
Furthermore, there is an almost unavoidable imbalance in power and 
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knowledge between the poverty researcher and the poor person; this has 
to be dealt with. 
 The third issue is fighting poverty and the question of moral responsi-
bilities of researchers. Poverty research is done not only to gather more 
knowledge about the poor, to count them and to describe their lives, but 
because this knowledge should be also used to a large extent to change 
something and to help end poverty. Many poverty researchers claim with 
Else Øyen that helping the poor is one of the major drivers to engage in 
research in the first place (Øyen 2009), but it is highly unclear what kind 
of obligation is triggered by describing and defining a person as being poor 
and towards what persons it is directed. Some sort of obligation is almost 
always implicitly inherent, and so many studies about poverty conclude 
with some sort of policy advice or name institutions that could make a 
difference. In the case of national or international poverty surveys that 
count and monitor the poor, those who are obliged to change the situation 
are often directly named: the particular state whose official offices track 
poverty, the European Union or the World Bank and its member states. 
Poverty research is therefore not only needed to guide policymaking; the 
definitions and measures employed have power (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith 
and Stewart 2006) – if one is not counted as being poor, it can mean that 
one does not receive benefits or other forms of support by the state. Alice 
O’Connor has described this issue from a different perspective and argued 
that poverty research that focuses too much on counting the poor and 
on refining methods to ‘intrude’ in their lives and to monitor them is in 
danger of losing its connection to economic and political issues. Rather, it 
is necessary to combine poverty research with inquiry and criticism of the 
economic, social and political environment in which poverty is produced 
and reproduced and how the national and international institutions have 
to change to get down to the roots of the problem. 
 Although liberal in origins, poverty knowledge rests on an ethos of 
political and ideological neutrality that has sustained it through a 
period of vast political change. Very much for this reason, it can also 
be distinguished by what it is not: contemporary poverty knowledge 
does not define itself as an inquiry into the political economy and 
culture of late twentieth-century capitalism; it is knowledge about 
the characteristics and behaviour and, especially in recent years, 
about the welfare status of the poor. (O’Connor 2001, 4) 
 The fourth issue is the inclusion of the poor themselves in theorizing 
poverty. This raises deep questions related to power: Who decides or 
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should decide what poverty is and who is characterized as poor? Who 
has or should have the power to help and change the living conditions 
of the poor? In short, whether one is counted as poor or not is usually 
not dependent on whether one views herself as poor. Poverty measures 
focus mostly – and for good reason – on objective indicators such as 
income, wealth, goods and capabilities, but there is a growing concern 
that this focus might be a major shortcoming and that the multidimen-
sionality of poverty and social exclusion demands  the inclusion of the 
view of the poor themselves (Brock 1999; Norton 2001). The rise of the 
debate about subjective well-being, which obviously cannot be deter-
mined objectively without reference to the interior view, and its use 
for poverty research is also an indicator for this (Kingdon and Knight 
2006). Finally, the  role of poor people themselves in the  conceptualization, 
measurement and evaluation of poverty is in question. Do they know best, 
maybe better than poverty researchers, what poverty means or should 
mean? Neither poverty research nor normative philosophy is situated 
outside the real world, which is full of relations of power and domin-
ation, and it is a fact that some knowledge is privileged and a few have 
the power to shape the discourse about poverty. Robert Chambers, one 
of the pioneers of participatory work, writes about that issue:
 A question remains: whose analysis and categories are to be privi-
leged? These are largely ‘ours’, those of professionals who are not 
ourselves poor, expressed in ‘our’ language. The words, concepts, 
categories and priorities of poor people, especially illustrated by 
the way they were elicited and expressed in the Voices of the Poor, 
were rich and varied with commonalities. There are trade-offs to be 
puzzled over: between ‘their’ realities and ours; between local partici-
patory diversity and commensurability for purposes of aggregation; 
and between many categories representing poor people’s realities and 
fewer categories more manageable for outsider professionals and for 
measurement. (Chambers 2007, 37) 
 We cannot tackle all of these issues in-depth in this book. They give, 
however, a first glimpse into the highly complex issues that surround 
any debate about poverty and the ways in which philosophical, in 
particular normative, questions, arise. This is not breaking news, neither 
to poverty researchers and policymakers nor to philosophers. However, 
today philosophy and poverty research still usually work separately and 
hence miss out on the benefits of a certainly needed interdisciplinarity. 
There are, of course, a few exceptions; for example, Monique Deveaux’s 
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(Deveaux 2013) attempt to include the poor as agents of justice (we will 
comment more on that in the last chapter) or Thomas Pogge’s discus-
sion about the flaws in the poverty measures of the World Bank (Reddy 
and Pogge 2010). But more needs to be done, and it is a shame that phil-
osophy is not a part of most interdisciplinary discussions about poverty. 
Such collaborations demand much from both sides: social scientists 
working empirically have to become aware of what they can actu-
ally profit from the highly sophisticated debates in philosophy about 
justice and morality, and philosophers need to acknowledge that the 
reality of poverty is much fuzzier than we often assume it to be and that 
constructing valuable theories about poverty and its alleviation implies 
doing justice to the empirical basis. 
 Let us now speak more about the aims and scope of this book. It is 
important to make clear from the beginning that we will be first and 
foremost concerned with child poverty as it typically occurs in devel-
oped countries with welfare systems, as in most member states of the 
European Union, the USA, Australia and Canada. There are many differ-
ences between these countries and systems, and it would be wrong to 
suggest uniformity here, but they usually manage to avoid, at least to 
a large degree, extreme or absolute forms of poverty in which children 
miss the resources for survival and basics such as shelter and access to 
the most important health care services. Nevertheless, studies show that 
child poverty is also a big issue in these countries and that most of them 
are far from giving all their children a fair start in life. The reason for 
our focus on child poverty as it appears within relatively wealthy states 
is threefold: First, it is to a certain extent a pragmatic decision. It is not 
possible to discuss all ethically relevant facets connected to child poverty 
in this book; we had to narrow down the topics of investigation for the 
sake of simplicity. Furthermore, data from developed countries are more 
extensive and more easily available. We know more about how poverty 
shapes children’s lives and the opportunities they get, and a moral theory 
can be developed in regard to a richer and more substantive material. 
Second, the injustices of child poverty are more difficult and philosoph-
ically challenging to grasp when relative forms of poverty are at stake. As 
we have already stated, in the countries we take as points of reference, 
children usually do not die because of poverty, and state support as well 
as welfare benefits damp the worst consequences of their situation. In 
some sense, they are better off than their peers in developing countries 
or failed states; a moral evaluation of child poverty needs to go deeper 
than pointing to the fact that even the most basic elements of their lives 
are missing. Finally, our focus on the concept of  social justice , which we 
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consider very useful and rich for evaluating child poverty, quite naturally 
leads to a focus on developed countries with functioning democracies 
and institutions which, despite all their problems and weaknesses, (still) 
provide a solid social structure for large parts of their citizenry, especially 
if they are compared to states where almost no infrastructure and only 
minimal state support is available. Most philosophers in the field devel-
oped their theories in regard to such contexts, and many discussions still 
relate to nation states and ‘internal’ distributions of goods, isolated from 
relationships between countries. We agree that it is important to extend 
these theories to the domain of global justice and world poverty, and 
attempts to do so have substantially enriched the theoretical landscape in 
the last years. In the last chapter, we will therefore briefly address some of 
the additional questions arising in relation to evaluating extreme forms 
of child poverty in the developing world. 
 Our book is located within a certain approach of normative reasoning 
and thinking about poverty: namely, the capability approach and its 
most influential representatives, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 
The capability approach has many advocates and certainly also many 
critics, and we neither hope nor aim to defend it against all of them. Our 
goal in this book is to apply the approach to a specific topic. Therefore, 
we will not be able to scrutinize it on a general and fundamental level; 
we leave these intellectual battles to others. Still, we will say much about 
the capability approach, how it should be applied to children and what 
additional value it brings for the analysis and critique of child poverty. 
As a consequence, we will bring forward several arguments that speak in 
favor of the approach in general and support many of its assumptions. 
The capability approach seems a good starting point for our examin-
ation, not only because it can provide the normative underpinnings for 
our goals but also because it is widely used in a variety of academic 
disciplines as well as policymaking. When it comes to academia, it is 
extensively discussed, developed, applied and criticized not only in phil-
osophy but also in economics, social policy, political science and devel-
opment studies, which confirms its interdisciplinary usefulness. A no 
less influential document than the Human Development Report, which 
is published annually by the United Nations and monitors human devel-
opment on a global level, explicitly draws on the capability approach, 
even if some have questioned how accurately the report represents its 
theoretical and normative background (Pogge 2002). On the national 
level, too, governments are interested in the approach and apply it for 
diverse purposes; the reports on poverty and wealth in Germany (Arndt 
and Volkert 2006) and the reports of the United Kingdom’s National 
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Equalities Commission, for example, apply the capability approach 
as part of their theoretical background for their respective concerns 
(Burchardt and Vizard 2011). And last but not least, it has been inspiring 
and guiding the work of NGOs and local development initiatives in 
many different countries and cultural contexts (Deneulin and Shahani 
2009). This richness is an asset for our examination of child poverty and 
social justice, and we will draw not only on the philosophical writings 
of Nussbaum and Sen but also on the research done in other disciplines 
which have applied the capability approach to children and to poverty. 
 Any application of the capability approach faces some challenges that 
should be made clear at the outset. To begin with, there is no full consensus 
in the literature on which set of claims and postulates are constitutive 
of the capability approach. In fact, different authors work on it, and 
each of them has introduced some new elements or focus points, some-
thing that is, inter alia, documented through a constant rise in academic 
publications on the subject. Furthermore, the capability approach can 
be characterized not only as a theory in political philosophy but as an 
‘intellectual movement and programme for action’ (Venkatapuram 2011, 
114) involving many different agents on the theoretical and practical 
level. This fact also introduces a certain internal variety and complicates 
its representation as a clear-cut theoretical concept. In the formulations 
of Nussbaum and Sen, there is no uniformity to be found, either. While 
Sen is considered the founder of the approach, Nussbaum joined in early 
on and over the years developed her own account, which is, in some 
aspects at least, different from Sen’s ideas. In the end, our suggestion will 
be to work with a kind of ‘hybrid’, combining elements of both theories, 
a strategy which has itself proven valuable in other contexts (see, e.g., 
Wolff and de-Shalit 2007; Venkatapuram 2011). 
 Besides the capability approach, another major influence on our exam-
ination of child poverty comes from the multidisciplinary research on chil-
dren’s well-being and well-becoming. We will argue that these concepts 
should have a central role in a theory of justice for children, claiming that 
a just society is one in which each and every child develops and achieves 
functionings and capabilities that are necessary for her well-being and well-
becoming. This introduction of well-being into the capability approach 
might seem odd, because of the rivalry between capabilities and subjective 
welfare as possible metrics of justice (a topic which we will discuss in more 
detail in the first chapter). Let us be clear from the beginning what we 
understand as well-being and well-becoming. They are not the same as 
subjective welfare or happiness or satisfaction; in our view, well-being is 
a multidimensional concept encompassing a wide range of important 
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features of children’s lives: health, education, social inclusion and partici-
pation, access to material goods and shelter and the like. A concept of 
justice for children that is oriented towards children’s well-being and well-
becoming is primarily concerned not with them being happy but with 
providing them with the full range of capabilities and functionings that 
they are entitled to reach comprehensive well-being. Such an objectivist 
understanding of well-being, as an actual state of being well, and of well-
becoming, as the change from one state of being to a state of being well, 
is now common in much research on children and guiding policies. The 
capability approach is itself such an objectivist approach towards well-
being; for example, Mario Biggeri and his colleagues understand children’s 
well-being as the combination of important capabilities and functionings 
(Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011). It is also possible to interpret the ten central 
capabilities of Nussbaum as being a formulation of a concept of well-being. 
This perspective has been articulated by Alexander Bagattini:
 According to the capability approach, the well-being of persons is 
identified with a bundle of capabilities that are essential for human 
nature. (This is seen in analogy with other beings in nature, like plants 
that need photosynthesis or predators that need to be quick and silent 
when hunting.) In her recent book,  Creating Capabilities , Martha 
Nussbaum gives a list of ten basic capabilities that are supposed to be 
constitutive for the well-being of human beings: life; bodily integrity; 
bodily health; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical 
reason; affiliation; concern for animals and plants; play; and control 
over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2011, p. 33f). Due to its objective 
account of well-being, the capability approach is very attractive for a 
conception of child well-being. (Bagattini 2014, 175) 
 Let us say something about the concept of well-being then. First, we 
suggest that well-being in childhood matters for its own sake. While it 
is true that most political philosophers evaluate childhood only insofar 
it contributes to the genesis of the characteristics necessary for the good 
life of an adult, this conclusion seems wrong, as a thought experiment 
by Harry Brighouse powerfully shows (Brighouse 2003): Imagine a tragic 
world in which happiness in childhood – even though no necessary 
condition – is a serious barrier to flourishing in adulthood. Under such 
circumstances, it is obvious that we would consider the scarce individ-
uals who managed to have both a happy childhood and adulthood to be 
privileged. The standard and more reliable route to get to a flourishing 
adulthood via a dreary childhood is an inferior option. Furthermore, 
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let’s assume with Brighouse that in such a tragic world there is a reliable 
correlation between the degree of dreariness in childhood and the level 
of flourishing in adulthood. Would we really judge parents who impose 
enormous amounts of dreariness on their children compared to those 
who allow moments of enjoyment, even knowing that it affects the 
child’s future negatively, as the better ones? We agree that the answer 
to this question is not an obvious one; there is the strong intuition that 
the well-being of children seems to matter for its own sake, independ-
ently of its contribution to life as an adult. It is simply a good thing that 
a child lives a flourishing life, exercising and developing her capacities 
(Macleod 2010). Accordingly, we assume, in line with most theorists in 
the field, that childhood is intrinsically valuable and that children as the 
subjects of moral concern have a right to a good life. 
 Second, the child’s condition, which includes a particular vulner-
ability, immaturity and dependency on others, makes her well-being an 
especially salient normative category. Children cannot be held respon-
sible for their life choices as adults can, and therefore any harm to their 
well-being is particularly problematic from a moral point of view. Hence, 
a society that does not manage to sustain a certain level of well-being 
for its children cannot be a just one. This does not mean, of course, that 
the well-being of children is the  only thing that matters for justice. The 
child’s future as an autonomous and thriving citizen – her becoming – is 
of importance as well, as is the well-being and well-becoming of all other 
members of society. However, since it often gets completely neglected in 
theories of justice, we want to stress clearly the importance that the well-
being of children, qua children, should have for normative reasoning. 
 Third, a comprehensive understanding of children’s lives must include 
a multitude of information. It just is not enough to know, for example, 
the economic situation of a child or her family in order to judge if she 
is indeed well off. There is more to disadvantage than can be expressed 
in monetary terms. In many approaches to the measurement of child 
poverty, this insight is well established. There, the well-being of chil-
dren is judged in different dimensions, which are also set into rela-
tion with each other. When looking at the lives of children explicitly 
from a  normative perspective, such a multidimensional approach is also 
requested. This is the case for the following reasons: First, if philosophy 
wants to develop an understanding of justice that is applicable in the 
real world and its non-ideal circumstances, it must work with a realistic 
picture of well-being. It should reflect our intuitive judgments about 
the subject and allow plausible assessments of the social position of an 
individual (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 21). It is obvious that different 
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aspects of children’s lives matter; it would be a theoretical distortion to 
reduce them to a single good or source and to suggest that being privi-
leged in one dimension compensates the difficulties a child experiences 
in another. Suppose, for example, that a child with superior academic 
achievements has serious difficulties socializing and finding friends. The 
argument that the success in one area is a good reason for neglecting the 
problems in the other does not, from a commonsensical perspective, do 
justice to the child’s situation and misses important aspects of her well-
being. Second, only a pluralist view of the well-being of children allows a 
differentiated look at what kinds of disadvantages are especially harmful 
or, to approach it from a different angle, which aspects of a child’s life 
can have a comprehensive and sustainable positive effect on her general 
situation. Evaluations from a social justice perspective must be sensitive 
to such differences. Of course, many empirical questions concerning the 
identification of the most important dimensions of a child’s life emerge 
here, and philosophy cannot answer them a priori. However, its theories 
must be able to grasp and conceptualize them adequately. 
 With our focus on children’s well-being we strongly agree that it is 
wrong to look at children  only as ‘human becomings’ (Qvortrup 1994; Lee 
2001), meaning that they are conceptualized primarily as the future adults 
they will become. There are very good reasons to take their well-being 
per se into account and to give it normative weight. In fact, this already 
follows from a very basic and commonsensical assumption about the 
moral status of children: namely, that they are entitled to the same moral 
consideration as adults. This means that their moral claims count equally 
to those of adult members of a society and that it is morally wrong to 
discount them with the argument that they are ‘only children’ (Brennan 
and Noggle 1997). However, we would also like to stress that consider-
ations concerning justice for children cannot exclusively focus on chil-
dren qua children. As important as it is to recognize the ‘being’ child as 
a social actor in her own right participating in and constructing her own 
childhood (Uprichard 2008, 304), there is also a need to allow for a life 
course perspective which recognizes that children usually become adults 
and that childhood is the most formative period of human life, influen-
cing profoundly the level of well-being one experiences later on, from 
adulthood to old age. The overemphasis on the child’s future and the 
child’s becoming, which is prevalent in large parts of political philosophy, 
should not be replaced by an overemphasis on childhood itself as is, at 
least partly, currently the case in the blooming field of childhood studies 
(Uprichard 2008, 305; Qvortrup 2004, 269). Rather, the being and the 
becoming aspects of childhood have to be brought together, and a child-
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sensitive concept of justice has to operate within the tension between a 
present- and a future-centered perspective on children’s lives. This does 
not mean a return to an oversimplifying and misleading notion of chil-
dren as incomplete or innocent incompetents (Archard 2004) who stand 
in sharp contrast to fully developed and capable adults. Competency 
depends on both context and task, and in many aspects and situations, 
children can in fact be more competent than adults (Alanen and Mayall 
2001); in addition, it must be acknowledged that development and change 
are processes at work during the whole life cycle, including adulthood 
and old age. Still, we suggest that the child’s future and her  well-becoming , 
that is, her development to a state of well-being over time, is a particularly 
important normative category; justice should be concerned with human 
life as a whole and not just with sections of it. Well-being in adulthood 
and old age is also morally relevant, and therefore one should not under-
estimate well-becoming considerations, especially since they can get into 
conflict with claims to a child’s well-being. And while childhood is intrin-
sically valuable and should not be subordinated to adulthood or seen as 
a mere preparatory phase, it is reasonable to say that children (normally) 
lack morally relevant characteristics that are of great importance for adult-
hood and that can be certainly fostered – but also inhibited – by the way 
children are raised and educated. In particular, we want to argue that the 
ability to live a self-determined and autonomous life according to a mature 
conception of the good is generally a valuable achievement in human life 
(Rawls 1971; Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). Now, to act on one’s own judg-
ment and to live a life one has reason to value presupposes knowledge, 
experience, stability of character, the ability to assess the consequences of 
one’s actions and to relate them with one’s identity in time, as well as a 
certain level of emotional health. These abilities, skills and facets of life 
have to be trained and nurtured – if not, the well-being in adulthood, 
which crucially includes the ability to act on one’s own judgments, is 
seriously jeopardized. However, sometimes trade-offs are necessary, and 
so the way children are treated and reared should also include a develop-
mental perspective (Noggle 2002; Brighouse 2003; Adams 2008). Indeed, 
it is very plausible to claim that children have a right to an adequate 
development of their capacities, especially those relevant for exercising 
autonomy broadly construed. Accordingly, injustices for children can 
be comprehensively grasped only when the effects certain treatments in 
childhood have on the whole life course are considered. 
 Before we present a brief outline of the chapters in this book, we want to 
say something about two issues that we do not deal with but that are related 
to the topic at hand. The first issue is the question of the moral status of 
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children, in particular toddlers and newborns, compared to that of (some) 
animals. There is some philosophical debate about why we should treat 
such young children differently compared to bonobos or other apes, and 
this debate is centered on issues of rationality, autonomy and the ability 
to experience harm. We do not have a clear-cut answer and we also do not 
engage with this question in this book. Our premise is to say that human 
children have a moral status which implies that we should treat them 
with respect and be concerned about their well-being and well-becoming. 
We will later on explicate what this means in terms of responsibilities of 
different agents of justice towards children. Whether this moral status 
should also be applied to other non-human children is not our concern; 
we leave it to others to debate whether or not a just society would also 
require us to battle child poverty among non-human animals. 
 Closely connected to that issue is the second question: the status of 
children not yet born. This question has two aspects, both of which are 
connected to a rich as well as controversial philosophical and political 
debate. On the one hand a society which wants to realize justice for all its 
children has to take a stance on abortion and also on what it owes to chil-
dren during pregnancy. We also do not give a answer here, although we 
will briefly touch upon the issue that it can have harmful consequences 
if the mother is poor during pregnancy and that this health risk for the 
baby has to be taken seriously. It is a very delicate question whether or 
not the right answer here is mandatory prenatal care, based on evidence 
that being poor influences reproductive health and that girls living in 
poverty more often get pregnant (voluntarily and involuntarily) than 
their non-poor peers. On the other hand we focus in this book more or 
less exclusively on children already born, and we do engage with ques-
tions of intergenerational justice. Poverty reduction and alleviation, also 
during childhood, fight an injustice that should not exist from the start, 
and intergenerational justice is part of the larger question of how we can 
make sure that each and every child that is born is free of poverty. 
 This book is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1 develops a concept 
of social justice for children. We will argue that the capability approach 
provides a good framework and discuss some issues that arise when 
applying this approach to children. Neither Sen nor Nussbaum have 
written much about children, how a capability-oriented concept of 
justice for children should be constructed and in what ways it differs 
from a concept for adults. The most important modification we want 
to make is to have a more dynamic understanding of functionings and 
capabilities, since childhood is a phase of development. Furthermore, an 
initial focus on achieved functionings seems advisable, since children 
Philosophy and Child Poverty 13
lack some of the conditions, like autonomy and rationality, to enjoy 
capabilities in the genuine sense of the term. We will also tackle the 
issues of selecting relevant functionings and capabilities for children and 
will specify which distributional rule is best suited for our purposes. We 
will suggest that a sufficiency-based rule is the most adequate one and 
explain how it should be interpreted in the context of modern welfare 
states. Nussbaum and other capability theorists present the capability 
approach as a concept of minimal justice, which focuses on severe injus-
tices as they typically appear in global poverty in poorer countries. This 
feature of the approach poses some problems for our case, since we will 
criticize child poverty in affluent countries, where poverty is usually less 
severe and harmful. We will conclude the first chapter by claiming that 
children are entitled to a set of functionings and, as they grow older, 
capabilities that are important for their well-being and well-becoming. 
It is a question of justice that they enjoy these functionings and capabil-
ities up to a certain threshold as far as the states in which they live can 
secure. Furthermore, every child is, within reasonable limits, entitled to 
develop and achieve well-being as adults. We want to catch this aspect 
with the term ‘equality of opportunity to well-being’, which, again, can 
be expressed on the basis of important functionings and capabilities. 
 In Chapter 2, we will, based on these normative considerations, 
examine child poverty and investigate how it affects certain important 
functionings and capabilities related to both the well-being and well-
becoming of children. We will focus particularly on mental and physical 
health, education and social inclusion, which we consider rather uncon-
troversial aspects of the well-being and well-becoming of children. We 
develop our argument in close dialogue with the results of empirical 
research and show that there is overwhelming evidence that child 
poverty has detrimental effects on all of them. This finding will lead to 
the conclusion that child poverty has to be understood as a corrosive 
disadvantage. It negatively affects more than one important functioning 
or capability, both horizontally and temporally: child poverty is corro-
sive during childhood, throughout the whole future life course of the 
children and to their chances for well-being as adults. 
 In Chapter 3, we will focus on ‘agents of justice’; that is, persons or 
institutions responsible for securing justice for children in poverty. We 
will develop a model of responsibilities, using and further advancing a 
suggestion of Iris Young as presented in her book  Responsibilities for Justice . 
There, she distinguishes different grounds or parameters that can be used 
to attribute agents of justice with various kinds and weights of responsi-
bilities. The grounds that will be at the heart of our model are causation 
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(being responsible for that injustice in the first place), power (being able 
to help the victims of that injustice), privilege (having benefited from 
the existence of that injustice) and interest (having an interest in over-
coming that injustice). We will then distinguish eight potential groups 
of agents of justice (the poor child, the family and close caregivers, the 
neighborhood and close social environment, the state and its institu-
tions, the community of citizens, the economy, the international institu-
tions, the global community) and give a first ranking of the weight of 
their responsibilities in the context of child poverty. Our model is still 
vague, but this reflects both the complexity of the issue and the limits of 
philosophical inquiry. Attributing concrete responsibilities to the groups 
of agents we named based on the criteria we presented requires deeper 
empirical knowledge than we can bring to bear in this book, and to some 
extent it will never be possible to disentangle all of the relations and 
interferences. We will then take a closer look at two highly influential 
agents: the family and the state. We will argue that families in poverty 
are limited in their power and that their parenting behavior is shaped 
and influenced by how these parents grew up and how they have lived 
in poverty. It is not possible to disaggregate exactly how much of the 
behaviors that are actually harming their children can be attributed to 
this circumstance, for which they are not responsible themselves, and 
how much responsibility they have to shoulder. Being poor comes with a 
restriction of freedom; this restriction, however, is not a total one, and it 
would be unjust to neglect poor parents completely as agents of justice. 
We will conclude that the state has high responsibilities to support the 
child and her family in order to overcome poverty and to secure that the 
child achieves the functionings and capabilities she is entitled to. 
 Finally, instead of summarizing the book, Chapter 4 will sketch how 
our concept could be advanced to cover issues of global justice and 
global child poverty, which we widely neglect in the other chapters. We 
will identify a few of the questions that need to be tackled and give an 
idea how they should be approached. Again, the great urgency and need 
to address child poverty as a global phenomenon should be obvious. 
Here too, however, the topic needs philosophical inquiries that clarify 
in detail the moral implications involved. 
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